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1 Abstract
The projected increase of genotyping in the clinic and the rise of large ge-
nomic databases has led to the possibility of using patient medical data to
perform genome-wide association studies (GWAS) on a larger scale and at a
lower cost than ever before. Due to privacy concerns, however, access to this
data is limited to a few trusted individuals, greatly reducing its impact on
biomedical research. Privacy-preserving methods have been suggested as a
way of allowing more people access to this precious data while protecting pa-
tients. In particular, there has been growing interest in applying the concept
of differential privacy to GWAS results. Unfortunately, previous approaches
for performing differentially private GWAS are based on rather simple statis-
tics that have some major limitations–in particular, they do not correct for
population stratification, a major issue when dealing with the genetically
diverse populations present in modern GWAS. To address this concern we
introduce a novel computational framework for performing GWAS that tai-
lors ideas from differential privacy to protect private phenotype information,
while at the same time correcting for population stratification. This frame-
work allows us to produce privacy-preserving GWAS results based on two of
the most commonly used GWAS statistics: EIGENSTRAT and linear mixed
model (LMM) based statistics. We test our differentially private statistics,
PrivSTRAT and PrivLMM, on both simulated and real GWAS datasets and
find that they are able to protect privacy while returning meaningful GWAS
results.
2 Introduction
With the projected increase of genotyping in the clinic and the rise of large
genomic databases, there has been increasing interest in using patient data
to perform genome-wide association studies (GWAS) [39, 26]. The idea is
to allow doctors and researchers to query patient electronic health records
(EHR) to see which diseases are associated with which genomic alterations,
avoiding the high costs required to recruit and genotype patients for a stan-
dard GWAS. Using this valuable data, however, leads to major privacy con-
cerns for patients [30]. These privacy concerns have led to tight regulations
over who can use this patient data–often it is limited to individuals who
have gone through a time consuming and burdensome application process.
Various approaches have been suggested for overcoming this major bottle-
neck in biomedical research. In particular, there has been interest in using
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a technique known as differential privacy [4] to allow researchers access to
this genomic data [24, 25, 37, 42, 18, 19, 14] while preserving privacy.
Privacy concerns are not the only difficulty facing modern GWAS.
GWAS aim to find biologically meaningful associations between common
alleles in the population and disease status. This task, however, is compli-
cated by systematic differences between different human populations [13]. It
is often the case that biologically meaningful mutations are inherited jointly
with mutations that have no such meaning, leading to false GWAS hits. A
classic example of this phenomenon is given by the lactase gene. This gene
is responsible for the ability to digest lactose (such as in milk), and is more
common in those of Northern European ancestry than those of East Asian
ancestry. People from Northern Europe are also, on average, taller than
those from East Asia. This would lead a naive statistical method to erro-
neously suggest that the lactase gene is related to height. Such confounding
effects are a major problem that can render the results of a GWAS (partic-
ularly one with large sample size) nearly nonsensical [12]. In order to avoid
this common problem, known as population stratification, various methods
have been employed (EIGENSTRAT [6], linear mixed models (LMMs) [13],
genomic control (GC) [2], etc.).
In this work, we introduce the first method that jointly addresses the
population stratification and privacy issues that arise when using patient
data to answer GWAS queries.
2.1 Our Contribution
Previous work on differentially private GWAS have completely ignored the
problem of population stratification, greatly limiting its applicability in the
real world [17]. To help remedy this deficiency, we focus on producing
GWAS results that can handle population stratification while still preserv-
ing private phenotype information (e.g., disease status). In particular, we
develop a framework that can turn commonly used GWAS statistics (such as
LMM based statistics and EIGENSTRAT) into tools for performing privacy-
preserving GWAS. We will demonstrate this approach on two such statistics,
EIGENSTRAT [6] and LMM based statistics [13]. Our methods, denoted
PrivSTRAT and PrivLMM respectivelly, use a modified form of differential
privacy to protect private phenotype information (disease status) from being
leaked while returning highly associated SNPs.
In particular, our new privacy framework allows us to repurpose three
previous differentially private methods for picking high scoring SNPs to the
EIGENSTRAT and LMM settings. We develop new algorithms that make
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these methods tractable (a limitation of some of the most promising differ-
entially private GWAS methods proposed previously [37, 41]). We compare
these methods on real and synthetic data, showing that one method, referred
to as the distance method, greatly outperforms the other two in terms of ac-
curacy. Importantly, ours is the first method able to correct for population
stratification while preserving privacy in GWAS results. This opens up the
possibility of applying a differentially private framework to large, genetically
diverse groups of patients (such as those present in EHR!).
2.2 Previous Work
GWAS aim to determine which common single nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs) in the population are associated with a given disease. Numerous
techniques (including genomic control [2], EIGENSTRAT [6], and linear
mixed models (LMM) [13]) have been suggested to deal with population
stratification in GWAS. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in
using LMMs for this task, thanks to improved algorithms [11, 8, 36, 17, 20].
Even still, EIGENSTRAT remains a common approach for dealing with
population stratification in practice.
Interest in privacy-preserving genomic analysis is a bit more recent [5,
28, 31, 21, 9, 35, 10]. In particular, numerous works [22, 27, 23, 43, 34] have
shown that GWAS statistics can leak private information about participants.
Differential privacy [4] (see below) has been suggested as a possible solution
to the privacy conundrum [24, 41, 25, 37, 42, 18, 19, 14, 10]. There has even
been a competition, hosted by iDASH, to help come up with better methods
for performing differentially private GWAS [24]. Note that, although much
of this research has been encouraging, there is still a long way to go [16].
3 Definitions and Notation
3.1 GWAS Revisited
The aim of a genome-wide association study (GWAS) is to link SNPs in
a study cohort to a disease of interest. This is done by taking a large
cohort of individuals, genotyping them at common SNPs, and, for each
SNP, performing a statistical test to see if that SNP is associated with the
disease in question. Note that, as with most work on GWAS, we assume
each SNP has exactly two alleles: a minor allele and a major allele.
Formally, we have a group of n individuals genotyped at m SNPs. Let
D be an n by m genotype matrix, where the ith entry in the jth row of D
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is equal to the number of times the minor allele occurs in the jth individual
at the ith SNP (for autosomal SNPs this number is in the set {0, 1, 2}).
Details on dealing with missing genotypes are provided in the Appendix.
Let X be the n by m matrix obtained by mean centering and variance
normalizing each column of the genotype matrix D. Let xi be the column
of X corresponding to SNP i. Similarly, let y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ {0, 1}n be
a vector of phenotypes, where yj = 1 if the jth individual has the disease,
yj = 0 otherwise.
Given X and y, we would like to figure out which SNPs are associated
with the disease in question. Naively, one could use a simple statistical test
to figure this out (allelic test statistic, pearson test, logistic regression, linear
regression, etc.). These statistics, however, ignore the effects of population
stratification and lead to many false positives. Luckily, there have been
various methods created to overcome this issue. Here we will mainly focus
on one, EIGENSTRAT [6], briefly touching on LMM based association [11].
3.2 EIGENSTRAT Revisited
One of the most popular methods for overcoming population stratification
is known as EIGENSTRAT. This method is based off the observation that
the top few principle components (which is to say the top few eigenvectors
of the genetic covariance matrix) of the genotype matrix encode information
about population stratification.
Formally, the method applies an eigendecomposition to the n by n co-
variance matrix XXT . EIGENSTRAT works by forming two new vectors,
y∗ and x∗i , where y
∗ (respectively x∗i ) is given by mean centering y (respec-
tively xi) and projecting the result onto the vector space orthogonal to the
top k eigenvectors of XXT (k is a user defined parameter; we set k = 5).
Intuitively, this procedure for producing y∗ and x∗i can be thought of as
removing the effects of population stratification. Having removed the pop-
ulation stratification, all that remains is to test if y∗ and x∗i are correlated.
This is done using a χ2-distributed statistic:
χ2i =
(n− k − 1)(x∗i · y∗)2
|x∗i |2|y∗|2
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4 Methods
4.1 Differential Privacy and Private Phenotypes
Differential privacy [4] is an approach to privacy introduced by the cryp-
tographic community. In a nutshell, it promises that that a given statistic
calculated on one dataset behaves like the same statistic calculated on any
dataset that differs in exactly one individual. In our case, since we are fo-
cusing on protecting phenotype data, we use a slightly modified definition:
Definition 1. Let F be a random function that takes in a n by m genotype
matrix, D, and an n dimensional phenotype vector, y, and outputs F (D, y),
where the output is in some set Ω. We say that F is -phenotypic differen-
tially private for some privacy parameter  > 0 if, for all genotype matrices
D, all phenotype vectors y, y′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that y and y′ differ in exactly
one coordinate, and for all sets S ⊂ Ω, we have that
P (F (D, y) ∈ S) ≤ exp()P (F (D, y′) ∈ S)
This differs from the usual definition of differential privacy since we
are assuming the genotype matrix D is fixed. Intuitively, our definition
says that the result returned by F when a given individual has the disease is
statistically indistinguishable from the result returned when they do not have
the disease (which is to say, for any S ⊂ Ω, testing if F (D, y) ∈ S reveals
negligible private phenotype information). This indistinguishability ensures
that F gives away negligible information about the private phenotype y.
The parameter  is a privacy parameter: the closer to 0 it is the more
privacy is ensured, while the larger it is the weaker the privacy guarantee.
This means we would like to set  as small as possible, but unfortunately
this comes at the cost of having less accurate outputs [4].
Note that this is a slightly weaker definition of privacy than previous
works–it does not guarantee that information about whether or not someone
participated in our study is hidden. That said, when dealing with EHR,
knowing that someone participated is equivalent to knowing they have their
genotype on record at the hospital, a fact that is unlikely to be private.
4.2 PrivSTRAT: Privacy-Preserving EIGENSTRAT
The differentially private GWAS literature has largely focused on three
tasks: picking highly associated SNPs, estimating association statistics, and
estimating the number of significantly associated SNPs in a study. Due to
6
space constraints we only consider the first problem here, though our frame-
work can easily accomplish the other tasks as well (see the Appendix for
details).
In order to pick high scoring SNPs in a privacy-preserving manner we
modify three previous methods (a noise based one, a score based one, and
a distance based one [37, 25]) to EIGENSTRAT.
Our task is to return the top mret scoring SNPs for some user defined
parameter mret while achieving -phenotypic differential privacy–that is to
say we want to return the locations of the mret SNPs with largest χ
2
i values
(Note that this is a slightly different setup than in standard GWAS, where
mret is not known ahead of time. A discussion of this point is provided in
the Appendix.). In order to do this, note that, if we let µi =
x∗i
|xi| , then:
χ2i =
(n− k − 1)(µi · y)2
|y∗|2
Since |y∗| does not change from SNP to SNP, we see that picking the
top mret SNPs using EIGENSTRAT is equivalent to picking the mret SNPs
with largest |µi · y| values. In order to do this in a privacy-preserving way
let
∆ = max
j∈{1,...,n}
max
S⊂{1,...,m},|S|=mret
∑
i∈S
|µij |
Our modified version of the noise based method for picking high scoring
SNPs [37] works by calculating, for each i, si = |µiy|+ Lap(0, 2∆ ), where
Lap(0, λ) ∝ exp(−|x|
λ
)
This method then returns the mret SNPs with the largest value of si.
Similarly, our modified score based method [37] works by picking mret
SNPs without repetition, where the probability of picking the ith SNP is pro-
portional to exp( |µiy|2∆ ). Both the noise and score method are -phenotypic
differentially private (proofs in the Appendix).
The final approach is known as the distance based method [25]. This
works as follows: the user chooses a threshold c. The ith SNP is consid-
ered significant if |µiy| > c, not significant otherwise (for example, c might
correspond to a p-value of .05 or 10−8). The neighbor distance for the ith
SNP, denoted bi, is the minimum number of individuals whose phenotypes
need to be changed to change SNP i from significant to not or vice versa.
Formally:
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bi = bi(c) = min
y′∈[0,1]n,c=|µi·y′|
|y − y′|0
where |v|0 denotes the number of nonzero entries in the vector v. Note
that bi = min{di(c), di(−c)}, where di(c) = min
y′∈[0,1]n,c=µi·y′
|y − y′|0.
In order to use this neighbor distance to pick high scoring SNPs, we first
have to let d∗i = bi for significant SNPs and d
∗
i = 1− bi for all other SNPs.
The distance based method picks mret SNPs without repetition, where the
probability of picking the ith SNP is proportional to exp(
d∗i
2 ). Previous work
[25] implies that this mechanism is indeed -phenotypic differentially private.
The difficult part is calculating di(c). Our main algorithmic achievement is
to show that this can be done using Algorithm 1.
Taken together, these methods for picking high scoring SNPs while
preserving privacy are called PrivSTRAT.
Algorithm 1 Calculates the neighbor distance
Require: y, µi, c
Ensure: Returns the neighbor distance, di(c).
Let uˆj = max(µij(1− yj), µij(0− yj))
Let lˆj = min(µij(1− yj), µij(0− yj))
Let i1, · · · , in be a permutation on 1, . . . , n such that uˆi1 ≥ · · · ≥ uˆin . Let
uj = uˆij for all j.
Let j1, · · · , jn be a permutation on 1, . . . , n such that lˆj1 ≤ · · · ≤ lˆjn . Let
lk = lˆjk for all k.
Let Uk =
∑k
j=1 uj and Lk =
∑k
j=1 lj , k = 1, · · · , n.
Return k such that c ∈ [Lk+1, Lk) ∪ (Uk, Uk+1]
4.3 PrivLMM: Privacy-Preserving LMM Association
Note that the above framework can be applied to other GWAS statistics
besides EIGENSTRAT. In particular, it can be applied to linear mixed
models (LMM) [13]. LMMs rely on the null model given by y = Xβ + ,
where  ∝ N(0, σ2eIn) and β ∝ N(0, σ
2
g
m Im) for some unknown parameters σe
and σg (where In is the n by n identity matrix).
Here we consider a slight modification of the LMM based approach
used in EMMAX [11]. This approach uses maximum likelihood (ML) to
estimate σe and σg. We can then apply the Wald test to see if a given
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SNP is associated with our disease phenotype. More specially, if we let
K = σ2eIn +
σ2g
mXX
T , then we get a χ2 distributed statistic
χ2i,LMM =
(xTi K
−1(In − 1n1n)y)2
xTi K
−1xi
where 1n is the n by n matrix of all ones. As was the case with
EIGENSTRAT, it is worth noting that, if µi,LMM = µi,LMM (σ
2
e , σ
2
g) =
xTi K
−1(In− 1n1n)√
xTi K
−1xi
, then χ2i,LMM = (µi,LMM ·y)2. This implies that high scoring
SNPs correspond to SNPs with large values of |µi,LMM · y|.
This allows us to apply the framework we used for PrivSTRAT to this
LMM statistic, giving us a method, denoted PrivLMM, that is phenotypi-
cally differentially private. The one added complication is that we need to
be able to calculate σe and σg in a privacy-preserving way, but this is easily
done using the sample-and-aggregate framework [1] (see the Appendix).
5 Results
We show that, on a real GWAS dataset with reasonable choices of  (around
1.0 or 2.0) and mret (mret ∈ {3, 5}), both PrivSTRAT and PrivLMM have
near perfect accuracy when using the distance method developed above. In
order to test our methods, we implemented both of them in python using
the pysnptools library [7].
5.1 Data
We test PrivSTRAT and PrivLMM on a Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA) dataset,
NARAC-1, from Plenge et al. [32]. After quality control it contained 893
cases and 1243 controls, and a total of 67623 SNPs to be considered. Since
this dataset has fairly little population stratification we also tried PrivS-
TRAT on a simulated dataset with two subpopulations. This dataset and
the code to produce it (based off Plink tools [33]) are available online.
5.2 Accuracy of PrivSTRAT
We tested the accuracy of PrivSTRAT for picking high scoring SNPs. We
tested each algorithm (noise, score, and distance based) for returning the
top mret SNPs, where mret ∈ {3, 5} (this choice is based off previous work
[37]. Other values are explored in the Appendix.), and for various choices
of the privacy parameter, . The accuracy of the returned results (averaged
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(a) mret = 3, Real GWAS (b) mret = 5, Real GWAS
(c) mret = 3, Simulated GWAS (d) mret = 5, Simulated GWAS
Figure 1: We measure the accuracy (the percentage of the top SNPs correctly
returned) of the three PrivSTRAT algorithms for picking top SNPs using
score (blue), distance (red) and noise (green) based methods with mret (the
number of SNPs being returned) equal to (a) 3 and (b) 5 for our RA GWAS
dataset, and with mret equal to (c) 3 and (d) 5 for our simulated dataset,
with varying values of the privacy parameter . We see that, in all four
cases, the distance based method outperforms the others. These results are
averaged over 20 iterations.
10
over 20 trials) is measured by the percentage overlap between the returned
results and the true results [37]. The results on the RA dataset are pictured
in Fig 1a and 1b, while the results on the simulated data are shown in
Fig 1c and 1d. We see that, as expected, as  increases, accuracy increases.
Moreover, we see that the noise and score based methods (in blue and green)
do not perform as well as the distance based method (in red). This is not
surprising, agreeing with previous work (our inclusion of the score and noise
based methods is for the sake completeness). Moreover, on the real GWAS
data we get near perfect accuracy for realistic values of  (values around 1
or 2) [38], accuracy that will increase as datasets grow.
5.3 Runtime
Though the privacy preserving methods add extra runtime to our method,
the runtime is less than that required by EIGENSTRAT to find the top
PCs.
Note that, as in EIGENSTRAT, PrivSTRAT calculates the top PCs by
performing singular value decomposition (SVD) on the normalized genotype
matrix X. Note that our current implementation of PrivMAF uses a fast,
approximate method for performing this SVD decomposition (details are
in the appendix). This differs from the standard smartpca algorithm used
by EIGENSTRAT (note that the newest version of EIGENSTRAT has also
implemented a fast approximation similar to the one we use)
Therefore, in order to look at how the privacy preserving nature of
PrivSTRAT affects runtime we looked at the runtime of PrivSTRAT using
both the exact and approximate methods for calculating the SVD (Figure
1). More specifically, we ran PrivSTRAT on the RA dataset described
above with mret = 3, and looked at the amount of time taken by each step
of the algorithm: calculating the SVD (using either exact (the smartpca
algorithm included in EIGENSTRAT) or approximate methods), calculating
the neighbor distance, and picking the SNPs. The results are an average
over 10 trials. We see that the calculation of the exact SVD is (by far) the
slowest of these steps, while even the approximate SVD calculation is only a
factor of 2 faster than the slowest step in the privacy preserving algorithm.
Asymptotically, we see that the calculation of the exact neighbor dis-
tance is by far the most time consuming (running in time O(n2m)), followed
by the calculation of the neighbor distance (O(nmlog(n))) which is slightly
slower than the approximate SVD calculation (O(nmlog(n))).
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Table 1: We compare the runtime of different steps of picking high scoring
SNPs in a privacy preserving manner (measure in seconds). The runtime
is calculated on the RA dataset, with mret = 3, k = 5, and averaged over
10 runs. We see that the smartpca method (the exact SVD method used
in EIGENSTRAT, see text for details) takes the most time, followed by
the calculation of neighbor distance. The approximate SVD method we use
takes about half the time of calculating the neighbor distance.
.
Approx SVD Exact SVD Calculate µ Neighbor Distance Pick SNPs
14.37 seconds 134.16 seconds 8.60 seconds 26.23 seconds .25 seconds
5.4 Accuracy of PrivLMM
We also tested the accuracy of PrivLMM on our RA GWAS dataset (we
do not include the simulated dataset due to space constraints). We used
the same set up as for PrivSTRAT. The results are pictured in Fig 2. We
see that, as expected, as  increases, accuracy increases, and that the noise
and score based methods (in blue and green) do not perform as well as the
distance based method (in red). Note that we used values of σe and σg
calculated using FaST-LMM [8] software. In theory, it is preferable to use a
differentially private approach to calculate σe and σg. A method to do this,
based on previous work [1], is given in the Appendix.
6 Conclusion
We have demonstrated we can perform privacy-preserving GWAS while cor-
recting for the effects of population stratification without significant increase
in running time. Note that the major computational bottleneck in our meth-
ods comes not from the privacy preserving component, but instead arises
from the original statistics (from calculating the eigenvectors in EIGEN-
STRAT or inverting the matrix in the LMM based statistic). As such, our
methods can exploit future computational advances in GWAS analysis. In
particular, we are interested in modifying our method to take advantage of
the computational advances introduced by Loh et al. [17] for LMM based
association.
We would also like to extend our methods to settings where stronger
privacy guarantees (beyond just protecting private phenotype data) are re-
quired. Another potential direction involves recent work showing that back-
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(a) mret = 3, Real GWAS (b) mret = 5, Real GWAS
Figure 2: We measure the accuracy (the percentage of the top SNPs correctly
returned) of the three PrivLMM algorithms for picking top SNPs using
score (blue), distance (red) and noise (green) based methods with mret (the
number of SNPs being returned) equal to (a) 3 and (b) 5 for our RA GWAS
dataset, with varying values of the privacy parameter . We see that, in both
cases, the distance based method outperforms the others. These results are
averaged over 20 iterations.
ground knowledge about haplotypes [19] and population genetics [10] can
improve accuracy in privacy preserving genomic analysis. It would be of
great interest to see if these approaches can be used to improve the accu-
racy of PrivSTRAT and PrivLMM.
In addition to improving privacy, recent theoretical work has shown
that differential privacy can help prevent false positives due to overfitting in
adaptive data analysis (looking at the data to decide which analysis tech-
niques to use), overcoming a major problem in medical research [3]. This
line of inquiry opens up exciting possibilities for how our results might be
used in the future.
Note that we are not advocating privacy preserving methods for all sit-
uations in which one might want to conduct a GWAS, but only when privacy
concerns would make alternative approaches cumbersome or impossible.
It is our hope that our Priv suite of tools will be used to open up
private genomics data to a much larger group of researchers. This access
will give researchers new tools that can be used to produce novel hypotheses
or validate old results in ways that are not currently possible due to privacy
concerns.
Availability: An implementation of our results and simulated data is
13
available on our website, http://groups.csail.mit.edu/cb/PrivGWAS.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proofs of correctness
Theorem 1. The modified versions of the score and noise based methods
for picking high scoring SNPs given in the manuscript are -phenotypic dif-
ferentially private.
Proof. The proofs are similar to those given in previous works [37], except
we use a score function where the score of returning SNPs s1, · · · , smret
equals
mret∑
i=1
|µsi · y|. For completeness we give the details below.
To see that this is true for the score method, let S be the collection of
all ordered sets of exactly mret SNPs. Define the score function
q : S× {0, 1}n → R
so that
q(s1, · · · , smret , y) =
mret∑
i=1
|µsi · y|
Note that, if y, y′ ∈ {0, 1}n differ in exactly one coordinate, then for any
s1, · · · , smret we have that:
|q(s1, · · · , smret , y)− q(s1, · · · , smret , y′)| ≤
mret∑
i=1
|µsi · (y − y′)|
≤ ∆
where ∆ is defined as in the text. Therefore the result follows from the
properties of the exponential mechanism [29].
Next consider the noise method. Again, using the fact that
|q(s1, · · · , smret , y)− q(s1, · · · , smret , y′)| ≤
mret∑
i=1
|µsi · (y − y′)|
≤ ∆
the result follows from [37].
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 returns the correct value of di(c).
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Proof. Let Uk, Lk, lk and uk be as in Algorithm 1.
Assume that y and y′ differ in at most k coordinates, then
µiy − µiy′ =
∑
j,yj 6=y′j
µij(yj − y′j) ≤ −(l1 + · · ·+ lk)
so
µiy
′ ≥ µiy −
k∑
i=1
lk = Lk
Similarly
µiy
′ ≤ µiy +
k∑
i=1
uk = Uk
so if di(c) ≤ k than Lk ≤ c ≤ Uk. It is easy to see, however, that if Lk ≤
c ≤ Uk than di(c) ≤ k, so di(c) = k if and only if c ∈ [Lk, Lk−1)∪ (Uk−1, Uk].
Therefore Algorithm 1 correctly calculates di(c).
7.2 Details About the Distance Based Method
Note that the distance based method for picking high scoring SNPs requires
the choice of a boundary value, c. This value is a kind of baseline. Previous
work, however, has shown that this arbitrary choice of c can change the
accuracy of the method [37].
In order to deal with this we use a slightly modified version of the
distance based method. For a given  and choice of mret, let x1, · · · , xm be
a reordering of the list |µ1 · y|, · · · , |µm · y| in decreasing order. Than we can
choose c so that
c =
|xmret |+ |xmret+1|
2
+ Lap(0.0,maxi,j
|µi,j |
.1
)
We than run the distance based method with a privacy budget of .9
and a boundary of c. This approach is still -phenotypic differentially pri-
vate, and removes some of the accuracy issues of previous approaches.
7.3 Simulated dataset
In order to produce simulated data, we used PLINK [33]. The code used to
generate this data is available on our website.
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We generated two populations of individuals. For each set we first used
plink to choose the MAF for 10000 SNPs, each uniformly at random from
[.05,.5]. 9900 of the SNPs had no effect on phenotype, 100 had an odds ratio
of 1.1. We then generated 5000 people from each of the populations, half
of whom where cases, the other half controls. We then combined these two
populations to produce our simulated dataset.
The code to do this is present online, as is the simulated data generated
in this way.
7.4 Estimating Heritability
Another issue to consider is the estimation of σe and σg in PrivLMM. This,
however, can be done using a sample-and-aggregate based framework [1].
In particular, the works by choosing some integer K > 1, and dividing
the set of participants into K disjoint sets of equal size. On each of these
subsets we can estimate h2 =
σ2g
σ2e+σ
2
g
using FaST-LMM [8], GCTA [40] or
a similar tool (our implementation uses FaST-LMM). This gives us K es-
timates of h2, namely h21, . . . , h
2
K . Let h˜
2 be the average of these K val-
ues. Our -differentially private estimate of h2 is then given by calculating
h˜2 + Lap(0, 1K) and rounding the result to the interval [0, 1].
Next we want to use the same framework to estimate σ2e . Note, how-
ever, that this would require a bound on σ2e . Note that σ
2
e ≤ V ar(y),
and that we can get a -differentially private estimate vdp of V ar(y) easily
using the laplacian mechanism. Then we can easily apply the sample-and-
aggregate methodology to max{vdp, σ2e} to get an -differentially private es-
timate. Since σ2g = σ
2
e(
1
1−h2 − 1) this allows us to get a 3-differentially
private estimate of (σ2e , σ
2
g). Note that this method relies on a very gen-
eral methodology, and so it seems likely much more accurate results can be
obtained with a little work.
7.5 Estimating χ2
In addition to picking high scoring SNPs, we would like to estimate the
associated χ2-statistic for EIGENSTRAT. In particular, assume we want to
get an estimate of χ2i for a given SNP i. Note, however, that
χ2i =
(n− k − 1)(µi · y)2
|y∗|2
so it suffices to get estimates of both µi ·y and |y∗| that are 2 -phenotypic dif-
ferentially private and combine the results. This can be done easily, however,
21
using the Laplacian mechanism [4], which gives us µi · y+Lap(0, 2maxj |µi,j | )
and |y∗|+ Lap(0, 2 ) as estimates.
The approach taken by PrivLMM is almost identical, except there is
no need to estimate |y∗|2, only σe and σg (see above).
7.6 Estimating The Number of Significant SNPs
We would also like to estimate the number of significant SNPs in a differen-
tially private way for EIGENSTRAT–that is to say estimate the number of
SNPs with χ2i > c for some user defined c (often corresponding to a partic-
ular p-value cut off). This is equivalent to estimating the number of SNPs
with |µiy| ≥ |y∗|
√
c
n−k−1 .
In order to do this we first calculate a .1-phenotypic differentially pri-
vate estimate of |y∗|
√
c
n−k−1 , denoted cdp, using the Laplacian mechanism:
cdp = (|y∗|+ Lap(0, 10

))
√
c
n− k − 1
Since we know how to calculate bi(cdp) (see above) it is easy to apply the
method of Johnson and Shmatikov [25] to get a .9-phenotypic differentially
private estimate of the number of SNPs with |µiy| ≥ cdp, which is returned to
the researcher. The result is an -phenotypic differentially private estimate
of the number of significant SNPs. Note that the choice of .1 and .9 are
arbitrary, and can be played around with for better results.
A similar method works for PrivLMM.
7.7 Accuracy of χ2
We also looked at the accuracy of PrivSTRAT’s estimated χ2 value. Fig
S1(a) demonstrates our method on real GWAS data, Fig S1(b) on simulated
data. We plot the median error over all SNPs, with error bars representing
the 25% and 75% quantiles. As expected our method increase in accuracy
as  increases.
7.8 Difference From Standard GWAS
The privacy preserving framework we introduce here is slightly different
than that taken in standard GWAS. In particular, in standard GWAS the
quantity mret (the number of SNPs to be returned) is not known ahead of
time. Instead, the user sets some p-value and gets back a list of all SNPs
whose p-value is less than that boundary.
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(a) Real GWAS Data (b) Simulated GWAS Data
Figure S1: Here we look at the accuracy of our mechanisms for approximat-
ing the EIGENSTRAT statistic on real (a) and simulated (b) GWAS data
for various privacy parameters, . We plot the median error over all SNPs,
with error bars representing the 25% and 75% quantiles. As expected we
see that accuracy increases as  increases (aka as privacy decreases).
If one wants to perform such a study, they can use the method intro-
duced above for calculating the number of significant SNPs (Section 7.6),
and then use the returned value as mret. In order to ensure accuracy, how-
ever, it seems more reasonable to choose a small mret ahead of time. This
ensures the accuracy of the GWAS on the highest scoring SNPs, even if it
comes at a cost to some SNPs near the p-value threshold of interest.
7.9 Large Values of mret
Our experiments show that, for small mret (mret ≤ 5 or so) that our methods
are reasonably accurate. It turns out, however, that like previous approaches
to differentially private GWAS, these methods do not always scale to large
mret when the number of individuals is small. This is shown for PrivSTRAT
on the RA dataset in Fig S2. We see that, though accuracy is comparable
to methods that do not correct for population stratification, it is still not as
useful as we would like. Luckily, this accuracy should greatly increase as n
gets larger.
It is also worth asking if accuracy is the best measure of utility for
our method. In particular, using accuracy to measure utility ignores the
difference between returning SNPs that score almost as high as the top
scoring SNPs versus returning low scoring SNPs. Moreover, GWAS assumes
we are using SNPs to tag nearby regions of the genome. This implies that
23
(a) mret = 10 (b) mret = 15
Figure S2: We measure the accuracy (the percentage of the top SNPs cor-
rectly returned) of the three PrivSTRAT methods for picking top SNPs
using score (blue), distance (red) and noise (green) based methods with
mret (the number of SNPs being returned) equal to (a) 10 and (b) 15 for the
RA datasets, with varying values of the privacy parameter . We see that,
in both cases, the distance based method outperforms the others. Even still,
the accuracy is fairly low for these large values of mret. These results are
averaged over 20 iterations.
returning a SNP that is near a high scoring SNP can also be useful. Using
accuracy as the measurement, however, ignores this as well. Therefore, in
order to decide if our method is useful for larger mret values, we should first
decide exactly what makes a given result preferable to another.
7.10 Missing Genotype
The above analysis assumed that there was no missing genotype data. In
practice, however, many entries in a given genotype matrix will be undefined.
There are various ways of dealing with this, most notably imputation. In
this work we take a simpler approach (one that is built into the pysnptools
package). This approach works by replacing each missing entry in the geno-
type vector at a given SNP with the mean value taken over all non-missing
entries at that SNP. We plan for future versions of PrivSTRAT to make use
of imputation based strategies for dealing with missing genotype data.
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7.11 Calculating PCA
By default, PrivSTRAT uses an approximate version of SVD to perform the
PCA in the paper, similar to that suggested in [15]. In particular, we use
the TruncatedSVD command in sklearn.decomposition. This is due to the
fact that calculating the PCA is by far the most time consuming step in the
algorithm. One can, however, use an exact version of the SVD (by setting
the -e flag to 1), which uses the SVD method in numpy.linalg.
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